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Abstract: 
 
Lowering of underwriting standards may have contributed much to the unprecedented 
recent rise and subsequent fall of mortgage volumes and house prices. Conventional data don’t 
satisfactorily measure aggregate underwriting standards over the past decade: The easing and 
then tightening of underwriting, inside and especially outside of banks, was likely much more 
extensive than they indicate. 
 
Given mortgage market developments since the mid 1990s, the method of principal 
components produces a superior indicator of mortgage underwriting standards. We show that the 
resulting indicator better fits the variation over time in the laxity and tightness of underwriting. 
Based on a VAR, we then show how conditions affected underwriting standards. The results also 
show that our new indicator of underwriting helps account for the behavior of mortgage 
volumes, house prices, and GDP during the recent boom in mortgage and housing markets. 
 
 
Keywords:  Underwriting, standards, mortgages, house prices, LTV. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Underwriting standards for residential mortgages (henceforth: underwriting) are now 
generally regarded as having been unusually lax during the middle of the 2000s. Underwriting 
then tightened up again during the financial crisis that began in 2007. The laxity of underwriting 
and its ensuing tightness since the middle of the 1990s likely contributed considerably to the 
unprecedented rise and subsequent fall of mortgage volumes and house prices. 
 
Conventional data do not satisfactorily measure aggregate underwriting over the past 
decade: Easing of underwriting, inside and especially outside of banks, was likely much more 
extensive than they indicate. The Fed’s survey data for banks’ residential lending records, for 
example, that easing for 2004-06 was about the same as the easing recorded for 1992-94; the 
data also indicate the 2004-06 easing was also about the same as the tightening recorded for 
2001-03. Easing inside and especially outside of banks was likely much more extensive during 
2004-06. To the extent that underwriting eased more at nonbank lenders, the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) survey data omit an important part of 
aggregate lending standards. 
 
Though we have several indicators of underwriting, none seems sufficient alone. 
Therefore, we sought to summarize the information about underwriting that was contained in 
several variables that we judged to be related to underwriting during this period. We used the 
data from the Fed’s questions to banks and from the OCC surveys that ask their examiners about 
banks’ underwriting. We supplemented those data with other data that are related to 
underwriting: credit spreads, the market share of adjustable rate mortgages, and mortgage 
delinquency rates. 
 
We argue that, for this time period, the method of principal components (PC) can usefully 
summarize the information in those variables about underwriting. We used the PC method to 
generate a single, new data series. We show that the resulting indicator variable exhibits 
correlations with the input variables to the PC method that are consistent with its measuring 
underwriting. In addition, the indicator variable suggested that underwriting eased considerably 
in the late 1990s and dramatically more in the middle 2000s; it suggested that underwriting 
tightened in and after the recession of 2001 and tightened dramatically starting in 2007, as the 
financial crisis erupted. Thus, the derived indicator tightness fits current understanding of past 
underwriting much better than conventional measures or the individual variables that were 
related to underwriting. 
 
For the practicing economist, having a single variable that both summarizes multiple 
measures and more accurately measures a phenomenon, like underwriting, can be very valuable. 
Being able to present a single, summary variable, for example in a time series plot, is often very 
informative. A summary variable can be especially useful in practice when other candidate 
variables have well known shortcomings. In the case at hand, for example, an audience might 
quickly understand the Fed and OCC surveys only cover commercial banks, whose market 
shares of mortgages originated and held dwindled over the past decade and whose underwriting 
probably loosened much less than underwriting outside of regulated banks. 
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To assess the caliber of the derived underwriting variable, we used the variable in a 
vector auto-regression (VAR). In light of our current understanding of how underwriting evolved 
over this period, the estimated effects on the underwriting indicator variable provide information 
about the caliber of indicator series itself. To the extent that the derived variable was estimated to 
respond in accordance with our understanding, that buttresses our confidence in the PC method 
and in the indicator that we derived. 
 
Further, the estimated VAR suggests how, in turn, the other variables, such as house 
prices and the volume of and interest rates on mortgages, were affected by changes in 
underwriting. Again, to the extent that the estimated responses to underwriting laxity and 
tightening fit our understanding, they further raise our confidence in the indicator of 
underwriting that we derived. In fact, the VAR-based estimates suggest that our new indicator of 
underwriting helps account for the path of gross domestic product (GDP) and for the 
unprecedented movements of mortgage volumes and house prices during the mortgage and 
housing booms and busts. 
 
Thus, we describe how PC helped in a specific instance with the challenges that 
economists generally face: (1) How to summarize several, related, imperfect indicators of a 
particular phenomenon and (2) how to convey the effects on, and the effects of, that phenomenon 
on other pertinent variables. 
 
II. Events and Issues 
 
Housing Markets since the Middle of the 1990s 
 
Over the past decade, house prices and mortgages rose enormously, peaked, and then 
began their declines. Figure 1 plots two quarterly data series for 1996-2008: Real house prices 
(RHP) and mortgage balances relative to potential nominal GDP (MORTPOT)). Both series rose 
steeply, nearly doubling by 2006, before declining thereafter. (Appendix B describes the data 
series more precisely and provides their sources. All data series are national aggregates and 
seasonally adjusted as appropriate.) 
 
Similarly, Figure 2 plots data for the four-quarter growth rate (%) of nominal house 
prices (GNHP) and data for the difference (%) between actual and potential real GDP.1
                                                          
1 Because the inflation rate was so steady relative to that of the percentage changes in nominal 
house prices over this period, the correlation between the percentage changes in nominal and real 
house price was over 0.99. 
 Figure 2 
shows that house prices not only rose considerably in the late 1990s, but that they accelerated 
thereafter, rising faster and faster through 2006, after which they decelerated and then, starting in 
2007, the real and nominal levels of house prices declined. Figure 2 also shows that incomes 
(relative to potential GDP) also rose considerably during the late 1990s, but from 2001 onward, 
hovered just below potential GDP. Given the quite rapid advance of potential real GDP after 
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2000, actual incomes rose considerably too. But, figure 2 also intimates that it would be difficult 
to attribute the strong and rising growth rate of house prices to accelerating income growth. 
 
What is Underwriting? 
 
 At various times, various analysts include different aspects of lending under the rubric of 
“underwriting.” For concreteness here, we take underwriting standards to consist of all non-
interest-rate terms and conditions that affect decisions about mortgage applications. Thus, we 
consider, for example, a lender’s choices about minimum FICO scores and documentation 
requirements and about maximum loan-to-value (LTV and applicants’ debt-to-income (DTI) 
ratios.2
 
 This is consonant with the Fed’s survey question, which asks banks about their “credit 
standards for approving applications from individuals for mortgage loans to purchase homes…” 
(See Appendix A.)  
 There are many ways that lender can ease or tighten underwriting. Lenders might lower 
the minimum FICO score or down-payment that they would consider. In addition to altering 
quantitative standards, lenders might also alter the nature of a standard. For example, during the 
housing boom of the mid 2000s, sellers (often builders) came to provide “gifts” of down-
payments to buyers to help them qualify for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages. 
From a very small share around 2000, by 2005-06, the shares of FHA loans that included down-
payment gifts from non-profits (which in effect were seller-funded) rose to nearly one-half of 
FHA mortgage originations.3
 
 Thus, there are myriad ways that lenders can ease or tighten 
underwriting. 
Possible Indicators of Underwriting Tightness 
 
Consider some of the better-known data series that we might use to better understand the 
time series of aggregate (residential mortgage) underwriting standards. Figures 3 and 4 plot 
average values of some variables for which lenders often have quantitative standards, say 
maximum LTV, based on data for loan-to-value at the time that mortgages were originated. 
Figure 3a plots the average LTV based on data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA). The average LTV might have suggested that underwriting had been tightening, as 
evidenced by LTVs falling (and therefore down-payments rising), from the mid 1990s through 
the mid 2000s. Analogously, the higher LTVs in 2006-08 might have been a signal of more lax 
underwriting then. 
 
Figure 3b shows the share of all mortgage originations that had LTVs greater than 90 
percent (or equivalently, had down-payments of 10 percent or less). The data in Figure 3b could 
be seen as support for the pattern of underwriting tightening followed by laxity. The series shows 
                                                          
2 Altering points and other fees associated with originating mortgages is another way that 
lenders can adjust the terms of their mortgages. 
3 A change in the law during 2008 attempted to outlaw the practice, presumably because the 
default rate on such mortgages was proving already to be much higher than on other FHA loans. 
Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2008, C10. 
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a rather steady descent from the mid 1990s until 2006, when it had fallen to about ½ its average 
value recorded over the full decade of the 1990s (not shown). The share then leapt, rising during 
the financial crisis to about twice the low levels recorded in the mid 2000s. A priori, one might 
have thought that the share would have tracked overall underwriting tightenings: If underwriting 
tightened, minimum down-payments likely would rise, thereby reducing the share of borrowers 
who made down-payments of 10 percent or less. 
 
But, by virtually all accounts, the opposite was true: Underwriting eased during the mid 
2000s and then tightened sharply when the financial crisis struck beginning in 2007. How then 
did average LTVs move opposite to underwriting laxity? The answer, as we now understand it, is 
that, at least in part, second mortgages originated at closing (“piggybacks”) and other 
mechanisms allowed more borrowers to have first mortgages that had 80 percent or lower LTVs, 
thereby reducing the series in both figures 3a and 3b. To further upset the conventional 
correlation between underwriting and its indicators, Sherlund (2009) shows that, at least in the 
securitized portion of the subprime mortgage market, average FICO scores rose quite steadily 
over the 1997-2007 period. 
 
However, some data series do conform more closely to underwriting having eased in the 
2000s before tightening significantly during the financial crisis. For example, again based on 
securitized subprime mortgages, Sherlund (2009) shows that average ratios of debt to income 
(DTI) and of loan balance to house value (LTV) rose and the share of adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMS) rose. Figures 4a and 4b, taken from Sherlund (2009), show that the combined, first-
plus-second mortgage-LTV (CLTV) rose and the share of originations that had full 
documentation declined throughout the 2000s, until the financial crisis began. And, the share of 
“low quality” mortgages, defined as those with low documentation and LTVs of at least 95 
percent, rose markedly after 2002, before plummeting in 2007. Thus, the data in figures 4a and 
4b suggest evermore lax underwriting until 2007. Therefore, although some commonly used data 
series seemed to signal tightening of underwriting standards, other series were simultaneously 
signaling laxity during the mid 2000s and tightening thereafter. Regardless, there is plenty of 
reason to suspect that the usual proxy variables for underwriting in the aggregate are unlikely to 
suffice for analyzing recent events in housing markets. 
 
Survey Measures of Underwriting 
 
 Federal banking regulators regularly conduct surveys to ask more directly about banks’ 
underwriting standards. The Fed asks banks themselves to report whether they have tightened 
underwriting; the OCC asks its own employees about whether the banks that they have directly 
examined have tightened underwriting standards. 
 
Figure 5 plots the net percentage of banks each quarter that were reported to the Fed 
(UWFED) and by the OCC (UWOCC) as having tightened underwriting.4
                                                          
4 The OCC reports data for the second quarter of each year. To obtain the data for the other 
quarters, we linearly interpolated between the values reported for the second quarter. This almost 
 (Appendix B lists the 
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questions and answers for the Fed’s and for the OCC’s recent surveys about residential mortgage 
underwriting. Note that the Fed includes mortgage interest rates in its question about 
underwriting standards.) The two series in figure 5 have been highly correlated (0.90). But there 
were also some notable differences. The net tightenings were reported to be generally negative 
(i.e., banks were easing underwriting) during the late 1990s in the OCC survey, but they 
averaged about zero in the Fed survey. Both surveys reported net tightening in 2001-03, during 
and following the 2001 recession. Underwriting then was reported to have eased (i.e., negative 
net tightening), especially in the OCC survey, during 2004-06. And both surveys then reported 
net tightening during the financial crisis, which began in 2007. 
 
 Figure 6 casts a different light on the same information used to compile figure 5. In 
general, we are more interested in the aggregate level of underwriting tightness, rather than the 
number of banks that tightened each period. As one approximation to the level of tightness, 
figure 6 displays the cumulative sum of net tightenings (which is shown in figure 5) of 
underwriting since 1996Q1 (when the series takes a starting value of zero). 
 
The cumulated Fed series, SUMUWFED, in figure 6 implies no net change in 
underwriting during the late 1990s or even from 2002 through the end of 2006. By contrast, the 
cumulated OCC series, SUMUWOCC, implies that underwriting eased considerably before the 
2001 recession. And perhaps especially notable given the widespread sense that underwriting 
had broadly and significantly eased from 2004 onward, SUMUWOCC exhibits a large and steep 
decline until 2007. Thus, the OCC data paint a quite different picture of banks’ underwriting 
standards. We cannot, of course, be sure which series more accurately portrays actual 
underwriting practices—presumably each series has some virtues. But, we can see that different 
series, even those that presumably are meant to measure quite similar phenomena in similar 
samples, can carry quite different information. 
 
 Other series are also likely to add information. They may cover different lenders or 
measure different aspects of underwriting. For example, the Fed and the OCC conducted surveys 
of commercial banks. Over this sample period, banks’ share of mortgage originations and 
holdings fell significantly. That decline may be partly attributable to other lenders’ having lower 
and lowered underwriting standards relative to those of the much more heavily regulated and 
examined commercial banks. Other variables might well allow for such developments. Thus, we 
seek a manageable list of other variables that might affect aggregate underwriting and/or might 
reflect changes in underwriting. 
 
Other Indicators of Underwriting 
 
 One less direct, but potentially useful, indicator of underwriting might be based on (non-
mortgage) interest rate spreads. The spread that we used as proxy variable for spreads on risky 
bonds was the difference (in percentage points) between high-yield and yields of U.S. Treasurys 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
guarantees that the OCC data here will be smoother and have more measurement error than the 
Fed data. 
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(with similar maturities). This spread is one indicator of the amount of, and return per unit of, 
credit risk. 
 
 Figure 7 plots SPREAD, the yield spread on high-yield corporate bonds. SPREAD 
declined until the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and then generally rose around the 2001 
and thereafter. The spread then fell precipitously into 2005 and was at about record lows rose 
until the financial crisis that began in 2007. Thus, credit markets seemed to judge that there were 
was relatively low default probabilities and/or low rewards per unit of credit risk. 
 
 The results of Demyanyk and Van Hemert (forthcoming) can be used to estimate changes 
in underwriting for some of the years in the mid 2000s. Their estimates are based on a very large 
sample of mortgages that were originated in the 2000s by banks or by nonbanks. Their estimates 
control for the effects of a lengthy list of factors on delinquency rates: borrowers’ FICO score, 
down-payments, house price growth, and so on. Given the controls, we interpret the remaining 
changes in default rates as reflecting the tightness of prior underwriting standards: The higher the 
ensuing delinquency rates (importantly, given their long list of controls), the more lax were 
underwriting standards.5
 
 The mnemonic for this variable is XSDEL. 
 Finally, we used an indicator based on the relation between the prevalence of adjustable-
rate mortgages and the interest rates on adjustable- and on fixed-rate mortgages (ARMs and 
FRMs). Historically, and not surprisingly, the ARM share of mortgage originations has reliably 
risen as FRM rates rose relative to those on ARMS. 
 
During this period, it appears that underwriting changes were perhaps concentrated 
among subprime and similar (e.g., Alt-A) borrowers. These borrowers disproportionately took on 
ARMs, which temporarily sometimes had fixed-rate-based payments and/or permitted negative 
amortization. Such “pay option ARMS” have become infamous. They also had become more 
numerous during the mid 2000s. Applications for these and other mortgages, as suggested by 
Figure 4b, were also subject to easing documentation requirements. Thus, through the middle 
2000s, more and more borrowers were being approved for mortgages with essentially easier 
underwriting standards. 
 
To allow for these developments, we constructed a data series, ARMRESID, which was 
the residual from a regression (over a longer, 1987-2008 sample period) of the market share of 
ARMs on a constant term, the nominal interest rate on FRMs, and the nominal interest rate on 
ARMs. The residuals from that regression indicate the otherwise-unexplained ARM share. We 
interpret the large positive values for ARMRESID over the 2003-06 period as indicative of 
generally eased underwriting standards. These market developments may well be peculiar to this 
sample period. So, one would not want to presume that this indicator would be valid for other 
                                                          
5 The Demyanyk-Hemert data cover 1997 through 2006Q2. We set observations before 1997 
equal to the 1997Q1 value. For the quarterly values beginning with 2006Q3, we added 0.75 to 
the prior quarter. Beginning with 2007Q3, for each ensuing pair of quarters, we subtracted 1, 
then, 2, and then 3 units. 
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situations. But, for this period it may well have captured an important part of the underwriting 
conditions that prevailed. 
 
 Other series are likely to convey additional relevant information about underwriting. But, 
we deliberately chose to exclude many of them. For example, numbers and volumes of 
mortgages, housing starts and residential construction expenditures, and house prices are likely 
to be useful indicators of mortgage underwriting. But, because our goal is to construct an 
indicator that we can then use to help account for movements in those and other variables, we 
chose not to include them in the construction of our indicator of underwriting. 
 
Variable Reduction via Principal Components 
 
We have argued that we have five variables that serve as indicators of various aspects of 
bank and nonbank underwriting standards. Each of the five variables had some strengths and 
some weaknesses as indicators of aggregate underwriting standards. (If any one variable had 
been plausibly regarded as a “sufficient variable,” we would have just used that variable.) 
 
Because they each are related to overall underwriting, they tend to be somewhat 
correlated; the average simple correlation coefficient between them was 0.55; the 
multicollinearity of this group of five variables was naturally considerably higher than that. 
Because each variable pertained to underwriting, using the five indicators separately would 
render interpretation somewhat problematic. For all of these reasons, we applied the method of 
principal components (PC) to our five indicator variables to derive a single, composite indicator 
of underwriting.6
 
 The resulting first principal component (PC) is the single data series that most 
closely tracks the five variables used in the PC analysis: the Fed and the OCC underwriting data, 
the risky bond yield spread, the Demyanyk-Van Hemert “excess” default rates, and the “excess” 
ARM share variable. In that way, the PC method assimilates some of the information from each 
of the five series into a single indicator variable. 
Use of the PC method in economics has often been hindered by the inability to attach 
persuasive structural interpretations to the results. In the case at hand, however, using input 
variables that are reasonably connected to underwriting increases our confidence that the first PC 
is a satisfactory candidate as an indicator of aggregate underwriting. 
 
The First Principal Component as an Indicator of Underwriting Standards 
 
Our confidence is buttressed by the resulting equation for the first principal component of 
the five chosen indicator variables. To the first PC, we assigned the mnemonic “UWPC:” 
 
                                                          
6 The PC method is theoretically the optimal linear scheme, in terms of minimizing mean square 
errors, for generating a few (say, one) data series from many more (say, five) series. In that 
sense, it is a method to reduce the number of variables to be analyzed. The PC method is non-
parametric and it requires no hypothesis about data probability distributions. By construction, the 
average value of the first PC here is zero. 
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UWPC = 6.40 + 13.9*SPREAD – 9.16*XSDEL – 2.11*ARMRESID 
                                    + 0.457*SUMUWFED + 0.576*SUMUWOCC 
 
As we might expect from an indicator of underwriting tightness, UWPC rose both with 
the Fed and with the OCC measures of underwriting tightness. UWPC also rose with increases in 
the bond-yield credit spread, SPREAD. On the other hand, UWPC fell, and thus indicated 
underwriting easing, as “excess” Demyanyk-Van Hemert-adjusted delinquency rates (XSDEL) 
rose and as the “excess” share of ARMs (ARMRESID) rose. Thus, UWPC seems consistently to 
rise and fall with underwriting tightness and laxity. 
 
By construction, UWPC is not perfectly correlated with any of the individual series but 
rather tends to reflect the common part of the movements that is present in each of the series. 
Nonetheless, the correlation with each of the series was quite high; the average of the five 
correlations with UWPC was 0.65, ranging from about 0.4 with ARMRESID to about 0.8 with 
SPREAD. To illustrate the differences in the time paths of some of the variables used to 
construct UWPC, Figure 8 plots SPREAD and the OCC-based cumulative tightening variable, 
SUMUWOCC. In general, SPREAD suggested episodes of tightening and loosening 
considerably before SUMUWOCC did. They both, however, pointed toward underwriting 
tightening starting with the 2007 financial crisis, an episode that everyone recognized. 
 
Figure 9 shows that UWPC hovered near its average value (zero) from 1996 until 2000. 
UWPC then rose modestly into 2002. UWPC then declined significantly and quite steadily until 
hitting its lowest value in early 2007. In that respect, UWPC suggests that underwriting eased 
significantly from 2002 through 2006. As a result, UWPC may contribute significantly to 
explaining the housing boom of the mid 2000s. 
 
The onset of the financial crisis in 2007 then saw UWPC rise very sharply, by more than 
double the prior decline, indicating extreme underwriting tightness. Again, the size and speed of 
the rebound of UWPC should not be too surprising in light of the extent to which the credit 
markets shut down in latter 2008, which was reflected in SPREAD and in the upward jolts to net 
increase percentages recorded in the Fed and OCC surveys. In that regard, too, UWPC appears to 
have generally tracked the tightening of underwriting standards during the financial crisis. 
 
III. Using Underwriting Measures 
 
Estimating a VAR 
 
To assess the caliber of UWPC as an indicator of underwriting, we used estimates based 
on a vector auto-regression (VAR). In conjunction with our prior understanding of how 
underwriting evolved over the sample period, the estimated effects on the UWPC provide 
information about series itself. To the extent that estimated VAR’s implied impulse response 
(IR) functions show that UWPC responded in accordance with our understanding, our 
confidence in the PC method and in the particular implementation that produced UWPC is 
buttressed. 
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Further, the estimated IRs indicate how the other VAR variables, such as the volume of 
and interest rates on mortgages and house prices, were, in turn, affected by changes in 
underwriting. Again, to the extent that the estimated responses to underwriting laxity and 
tightening fit our understanding, that further increases our confidence in the caliber of the 
derived data series for underwriting. In fact, the VAR estimates indicate that our new measure of 
underwriting helps account for the behavior of mortgage volumes, house prices, and GDP during 
the housing boom. 
One way to assess VAR results is to examine the estimated dynamic responses of each 
endogenous variable to “shocks” to other endogenous variables. These shocks, or innovations, 
are the movements in each variable that could not be explained by the past (and sometimes 
current) movements of the other variables included in the VAR. In the case at hand, the resulting 
impulse-response (IR) functions can be used to help assess not only the dynamic structure of 
housing and mortgage markets, but also the caliber of the constructed underwriting variable, 
UWPC.  
 We used quarterly data from 1996Q1-2008Q4 to estimate a VAR. In addition to constant 
term and a linear trend, the VAR included five endogenous variables in the following order: 
GAP, GNHP, MORTPOT, UWPC, and IMORT. GAP measures the difference between actual 
and potential real GDP. GNHP is the growth rate of nominal house prices. MORTPOT is 
mortgage balances relative to potential GDP. And, IMORT is the interest rate on fixed-rate 
mortgages. (Further descriptions and sources are given in Appendix B.) These variables were 
chosen because of the judgment that they were important, aggregate variables that were likely to 
affect or be affected by underwriting, or both.7
 
 
Estimated Responses 
 
 Figures 10-14 display the IRs for the five variables in the VAR. Each figure shows the 
responses of the other four endogenous variables to a one-unit shock to an endogenous variable. 
(Not shown are the responses of each variable to a prior shock to itself.) 
 
 Overall, there were relatively few surprises or puzzling results. In general, the impulse 
response functions were consistent with UWPC serving as an effective indicator of aggregate 
underwriting standards. Almost all of the IRs are consistent with that interpretation. And most of 
the other IRs are consistent with our prior understandings about the interactions of housing and 
mortgage markets. 
 
 Figure 10a shows that both incomes (GAP) and, on balance, house prices (GNHP) rose in 
response to an innovation in the amount of mortgage balances. Those responses are consistent 
with the shock emanating either from the demand or supply sides of the mortgage market. Nor 
does figure 10b sort out the source of the shock to mortgage balances. Figure 10b shows that the 
mortgage interest rate (IMORT) rose (consistent with responses to a demand shock) and the 
                                                          
7 The results were not very sensitive to a number of alternative specifications. For example, the 
results were not much affected by substituting real for nominal house price growth. 
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indicator of underwriting tightness (UWPC) declined (consistent with responses to a shock to 
mortgage supply) in response to a positive shock to mortgage balances. 
 
 Figures 11a and b display the responses to an upward shock to GDP (GAP). Figure 11a 
shows, not surprisingly, that both house prices and mortgage balances rose following a shock to 
incomes. Figure 11b shows that a shock to GDP raised mortgage interest rates. On the other 
hand, it lowered UWPC. Again, that adds support for UWPC’s serving as an indicator of 
underwriting tightness: As incomes rose, and therefore the likelihood of borrowers having 
payment problems receded, and as incomes also carried house prices upward, lenders may well 
have found it optimal to reduce their underwriting standards. 
 
 Figures 12a and b display the responses to an increase in mortgage interest rates. Again, 
conforming to conventional wisdom, higher mortgage rates were estimated to reduce GDP, to 
lower mortgage balances, and to lower house prices. The estimated IR in figure 12b suggests that 
higher mortgage interest rates were associated with lenders’ tightening their underwriting 
standards. This suggests that the effect of mortgage interest rates might, in effect, operate not just 
through their impact on explicit borrowing costs, but also through tighter underwriting terms and 
conditions. That tightening of standards effectively adds to borrowing costs and reduces effective 
demand for mortgages and housing. To the extent that underwriting standards do systematically 
rise with mortgage interest rates, the IR in Figure 12b further supports UWPC as a useful 
indicator of underwriting. 
 
 In Figures 13a and b, the responses to a positive shock to house prices are shown. Figure 
13a shows that an increase in house prices (controlling for all of the effects that are embodied in 
the lags of all of the variables in the VAR), not surprisingly, tended to raise both mortgage 
balances and incomes (or, equivalently, aggregate output). 
 
 More intriguingly, both UWPC and IMORT tended to fall (at least for the first two years) 
following of an upward shock to house prices. Given the strong momentum observed in house 
prices, an upward shock reasonably presages even further increases in house prices. Sensibly 
forecasting that the prices of houses, which collateralize residential mortgages, were likely to 
continue to rise, it then seems entirely rational for lenders to ease their underwriting standards 
when house prices rise. And that is what the responses in Figure 11b point to: UWPC declines 
consistently in response to higher house prices. 
 
For the same reason, lenders may have also been willing to reduce the spreads of their 
mortgage rates above a benchmark rate in response to higher house prices. Higher house prices 
reduce expected mortgage losses, thereby warranting lower mortgage interest rates. For the first 
two years following the shock to house prices, the responses of IMORT are consistent with lower 
rates. 
 
Finally, figures 14a and b display the estimated responses to estimated shocks to (the 
estimated indicator of) underwriting, UWPC. In figure 14a, an increase in UWPC, interpreted as 
a tightening of standards, led both to lower GDP (GAP) and to lower growth rates of house 
prices (GNHP). Both responses are consistent with UWPC as an indicator of underwriting 
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tightness. Figure 14b shows that tighter underwriting, in the form of an upward shock to UWPC, 
also tended to reduce total mortgage balances outstanding. The responses of mortgage interest 
rates to UWPC were mixed. It might well be that the positive effects result from lenders’ 
business practices that tend to raise price and non-price terms sympathetically. On the other 
hand, the negative effects might reflect that tighter underwriting would slow housing and 
mortgage markets and lead to lower rates. On balance, the effects on mortgage rates of UWPC 
did not come down as being consistently negative or positive. 
 
IV. Implications for Extrapolations 
 
Summary 
 
Underwriting standards may have contributed much to the unprecedented recent rise and 
subsequent fall of mortgage volumes and house prices since the mid 1990s. Conventional data do 
not satisfactorily track aggregate underwriting standards then. We used the method of principal 
components to construct a superior indicator of underwriting. We briefly discuss how and why 
the method can be usefully applied more generally in economic analysis and presentations. 
 
Unlike many conventional indicators, the underwriting indicator that we constructed, 
UWPC, tracks the increasingly lax underwriting the mid 2000s, followed by the extreme 
tightening of effective underwriting standards during the financial crisis that began in 2007. Our 
analysis then showed how the indicator of underwriting affected, and was in turn affected by, 
house prices, mortgage balances, GDP, and mortgage interest rates. The underwriting indicator, 
as well as the mortgage and housing variables, generally responded in the directions that we 
expected. Taken together, then, the estimated responses to the indicator of underwriting provided 
considerable support for the interpretation that UWPC serves as a useful indicator of mortgage 
underwriting tightness. Thus, the method and its implementation here do help us understand 
better some of the developments in mortgage and housing markets over the past decade. 
 
Double Bubble Trouble? 
 
That is not to say, however, that all of the patterns in these variables are explicable or 
even economically sensible. Estimating one, constant-coefficient VAR over this, particular, 
sample period is subject to at least two concerns. One is that the estimation period is short. The 
brevity of the sample was resulted in part from the absence of data before 1996 for at least two of 
the five input variables that we used to construct the indicator of underwriting, UWPC. A 
consequence of the limited data is that sampling errors for the estimated responses loom 
unusually large. 
 
Second, during part, but maybe not all, of the sample period, a mortgage and housing 
“bubble” may have taken place. It is standard to have various multiplier effects in the economy 
and in estimated models. But, bubble-like behavior may have imparted even stronger, 
extrapolative, or even temporarily explosive effects in mortgage and housing markets (and thus 
data) for some of the sample period. Such data movements may dominate much of the sample 
period here, which is partly what makes it so intriguing and worth analyzing. For example, the 
13 
 
ever-increasing growth rates of house prices through the mid 2000s, as shown in Figure 2, hint as 
such extrapolative patterns in the data.(To the extent that underwriting then responded to 
(forecasted, future) house price growth, as the estimates suggest, those extrapolations might then 
be transmitted to underwriting standards as well. And our indicator of underwriting does trend 
downward significantly until the financial crisis strikes in 2007. 
 
When extrapolative behavior is long and strong enough, its resulting effects on data may 
show up in estimated responses. For example, in the estimated VAR, for both house prices and 
for the underwriting indicator, the estimated coefficients on their own lags summed to more than 
one. Those sums then can translate into estimated responses, like those in figures 10 through 14, 
that do not dampen out soon, or maybe ever. Such estimates then may be accurate reflections of 
the operation of these markets in these years. But they are unlikely to be representative of the 
responses during more normal periods. 
 
Thus, the estimates based on data from periods of mortgage and housing bubbles of the 
magnitude and character of those in the mid 2000s are not likely to be representative. 
Extrapolating them to other times or places entails atypically high risks. At the same time, such 
estimates are of independent interest, helping us to better understand recent tumultuous events in 
mortgage and housing markets. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Fed and the OCC Surveys of Banks’ Underwriting Standards 
 
In their separate surveys, the Fed and the OCC ask about banks’ mortgage underwriting 
standards. 
 
The Fed conducts a “Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices at 
Selected Large Banks in the United States.” The sample of banks “is selected from among the 
largest banks in each Federal Reserve District. In the table, large banks are defined as those with 
total domestic assets of $20 billion or more as of December 31, 2008. The combined assets of the 
31 large banks totaled $6.2 trillion, compared to $6.5 trillion for the entire panel of 56 banks, and 
10.7 trillion for all domestically chartered, federally insured commercial banks.” (Source: April 
2009 survey results report.) 
 
In the April 2009 survey the Fed asked the following question: 
“Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards for approving applications 
from individuals for mortgage loans to purchase homes changed?” In earlier periods, the 
questions typically did not distinguish between prime and other applicants. 
 
The survey gives banks the following five choices for their responses: Tightened 
considerably, tightened somewhat, remained basically unchanged, eased somewhat, or eased 
considerably. 
 
The Fed, and many other sources, commonly report an aggregate measure of net 
percentage tightening which is calculated as the sum of the shares of banks tightening 
considerably and tightening somewhat (each equally weighted) minus the sum of the shares of 
banks easing somewhat and easing considerably (each equally weighted). 
 
The OCC conducts an annual “Survey of Credit Underwriting Standards.” “The 2008 
survey included examiner assessments of credit underwriting standards at the 62 largest national 
banks. This population covers loans totaling $3.7 trillion as of December 2007, approximately 83 
percent of total loans in the national banking system.” (Source: June 2008 survey.) 
 
In 2008, the survey included assessments of the change in underwriting standards in 
residential real estate loan portfolios for the 55 banks engaged in this type of lending among the 
62 in the survey. The survey gives examiners the following three choices for their responses: 
tightened, unchanged, and eased. We computed net percentage tightening as the share of banks 
tightening minus the share of banks easing. 
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Appendix B 
 
Data Descriptions and Sources 
 
 
GAP, the aggregate income variable, was calculated as the percentage difference between 
real GDP and real potential GDP. Real GDP was obtained from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and real potential GDP from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Both 
series are seasonally adjusted. 
 
RHP, real house prices, was calculated adjusting nominal (i.e., not adjusted for inflation) 
house prices using the GDP implicit deflator, which we obtained from the BEA. As data for 
aggregate house prices, we used the quarterly Freddie Mac conventional mortgage home price 
index. 
 
GNHP, the variable used to measure the growth rate of nominal house prices, was 
calculated as the percentage change in house prices over the most recent four quarters.  
 
IMORT, the mortgage interest rate, was measured as the quarterly, national-average, 
interest rate on 30-year, conventional, conforming fixed-rate mortgages as reported by Freddie 
Mac. 
 
MORTPOT, our measure of mortgages outstanding, was calculated as the ratio (%) of 
total, nominal, mortgage balances to nominal potential GDP. 
 
UWPC, the indicator of aggregate underwriting standards, was the first principal 
component from five data series. The five series and the method of principal components are 
described more fully in the text.
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 Figure 1: Real house price (RHP) and residential mortgage loans per potential gross domestic product 
(MORTPOT), indexed: 1996:1 = 100, Freddie Mac, BEA, Federal Reserve, quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 2: Growth in nominal house prices, year-on-year (GNHP) and output gap (GAP), Freddie Mac, 
BEA, (%), quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 3a: Loan to value (LTV) ratio (%) for all conventional single-family non-farm mortgage loans, 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 3b: Percent of conventional single-family non-farm mortgage loans with loan to value (LTV) ratio 
greater or equal than 90%, Federal Housing Finance Agency, quarterly data, 1996-2008. 
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Figure 4a: Average CLTV at Origination (%), Source: Sherlund (2008), monthly data, 2000-2007 
 
 
Figure 4b: Loan Documentation at Origination (%), Source: Sherlund (2008), monthly data, 2000-2007 
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Figure 5: Net percentage tightening of residential mortgage underwriting standards (percentage of banks 
tightening minus percentage loosening) from surveys of banks by the Federal Reserve (UWFED) and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (UWOCC), quarterly data, 1996-2008, OCC source data 
pertains to Q2; remaining quarters are linearly interpolated 
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Figure 6: Cumulative net percentage tightening of residential mortgage underwriting standards 
(percentage of banks tightening minus percentage loosening, indexed 1996 = 0) from surveys of banks by 
the Federal Reserve (SUMUWFED) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (SUMUWOCC), 
quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 7: Residuals (ARMRESID) from regression of ARMs’ share of conventional mortgage 
originations on a constant and on the interest rates for fixed and for adjustable-rate mortgages, Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, (%), quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 8: Cumulative net tightening (SUMUWOCC) and the yield spread between junk bonds and U.S. 
Treasurys (SPREAD) (%), Economy.com, quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 9: Underwriting standards estimated by first principal component (UWPC) of SPREAD, 
ARMRESID, SUMUWFED, SUMUWOCC, and XSDEL, quarterly data, 1996-2008 
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Figure 10a: Response of the output gap (GAP) and of growth in nominal house prices (GNHP) to a unit 
shock to mortgage balances (MORTPOT) 
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Figure 10b: Response of mortgage interest rates (IMORT) and of underwriting standards (UWPC) to a 
unit shock to mortgage balances (MORTPOT) 
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Figure 11a: Response of mortgage balances (MORTPOT) and of growth in nominal house prices (GNHP) 
to a unit shock to the output gap (GAP) 
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Figure 11b: Response of mortgage interest rates (IMORT) and of underwriting standards (UWPC) to a 
unit shock to the output gap (GAP) 
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Figure 12a: Response of the output gap (GAP) and of growth in nominal house prices (GNHP) to a unit 
shock to mortgage interest rates (IMORT) 
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Figure 12b: Response of mortgage balances (MORTPOT) and of underwriting standards (UWPC) to a 
unit shock to mortgage interest rates (IMORT) 
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Figure 13a: Response of the output gap (GAP) and of mortgage balances (MORTPOT) to a unit shock to 
growth in nominal house prices (GNHP) 
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Figure 13b: Response of growth in mortgage interest rates (IMORT) and of underwriting standards 
(UWPC) to a unit shock to growth in nominal house prices (GNHP) 
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Figure 14a: Response of the output gap (GAP) and of growth in nominal house prices (GNHP) to a unit 
shock to underwriting standards (UWPC) 
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Figure 14b: Response of mortgage interest rates (IMORT) and of mortgage balances (MORTPOT) to a 
unit shock to underwriting standards (UWPC) 
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